

anks

L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la
générosité de:

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

y
ry

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le
plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et
de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en
conformité avec les conditions du contrat de
filimage.

ned

es-

he




ed

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en
papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant
par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la
dernière page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second
plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires
originaux sont filmés en commençant par la
première page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par
la dernière page qui comporte une telle
empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la
dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le
cas: le symbole → signifie "A SUIVRE", le
symbole ▽ signifie "FIN".

e

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être
filmés à des taux de réduction différents.
Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être
reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir
de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite,
et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre
d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants
illustrent la méthode.





**ASSOCIATION
OF
THE CORPS OF GUIDES
CANADA**



SELECTED PAPERS

FROM

Lectures delivered at the Annual Meeting.

1914

**Authors are alone responsible for the views expressed in
their Papers.**



PRINTED FOR THE CORPS OF GUIDES ASSOCIATION,
CANADA,

BY

R. J. TAYLOR, 134 QUEEN STREET, OTTAWA.

17
1520

ASSOCIATION
OF
THE CORPS OF GUIDES
CANADA



SELECTED PAPERS

FROM

Lectures delivered at the Annual Meeting.

1914

**Authors are alone responsible for the views expressed in
their Papers.**

PRINTED FOR THE CORPS OF GUIDES ASSOCIATION,
CANADA,

BY

R. J. TAYLOR, 134 QUEEN STREET, OTTAWA.

005000 0

0 900733

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
1. Minutes of the Eighth Annual Meeting.....	5
2. A SUMMARY OF THE BALKAN WAR.—Major C. H. Mitchell.....	12
3. FINANCIAL STATEMENT.....	18
4. INTELLIGENCE DUTIES.—Lt.-Col. E. D. Farquhar, D.S.O.....	19

Minutes of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Corps of Guides' Association, held in Ottawa, at the "New Russell," on Thursday, February 26th, 1914.

Present:—Major-General Sir W. D. Otter, K.C.B., C.V.O., Honorary President; Lieut.-Cols. Van Nostrand, Richardson, Hesketh; Majors Mitchell, Browne, Mersereau, Stead, Chambers, De Kam, O'Hara; Captains Gillies, Ross, Goodwin, Tyrrell, Weekes, Biggs, C. J., Sifton, J.; Lieutenants Howland, Dansereau, J. A. L.; the Officer Administering the Corps (Major Gordon Hall), and the Secretary (Captain Sitwell).

The proceedings opened at 10.50 a.m., with Lieut.-Colonel Van Nostrand in the Chair.

The minutes of the last regular meeting were read.

Moved by Major Mitchell, seconded by Major De Kam, that these minutes be confirmed.—Carried.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES.—The report of the Committee who arranged the printing of the last Annual Report and papers, read before the meeting, was received and the thanks of the meeting tendered to those who undertook the work of revision and printing.

PROPOSALS FOR MEMBERSHIP.—Lieuts. Schwartz, Shanly, Hember, White and Richardson were proposed by Major Mitchell as members of the Guides' Association.

The Secretary proposed that Major George Paley, The Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own), be made an honorary member.

Lieut. Howland seconded these motions and they were carried.

LETTERS OF REGRET at inability to be present, were received from the following officers:—Lieut.-Colonel Burns; Majors W. B. Anderson, G. S.; Weeks, Parsons, Jost, Bryan and Leonard; Captains Van Tuyt, R.C.E., Palmer, Goldie, Longstaff, Clay and Barber; Lieuts. E. L. Caldwell, R.C.D.; Hember, Tait, Sifton, C., Daniel, Greening.

TELEGRAMS were received from Lieut.-Colonels Lamb and Lordly.

The Treasurer (Major Browne), presented the financial statement, showing a credit balance of \$411.05, including \$300.00 from Lieut. Johnston.

It being pointed out that many officers had not paid their dues, a discussion on the subject was invited.

Sir William Otter remarked upon "subscriptions to Associations and Messes, generally."

Major Mitchell was in favour of keeping the "Johnston Fund" in a separate account, and insisting that every member of the Corps be compelled to join the Association.

The Officer Administering enlightened the members as to how funds were used in other units and organizations.

Captains Biggs and Sifton suggested to increase the dinner fee, this year, to \$5.00, and a difference of opinion rising thereon, regarding fees for guests, it was moved by Captain Biggs, seconded by Captain Weekes, that the dinner fee for members and their guests be \$5.00.

It was moved by Major Browne, seconded by Major Mitchell, that the financial report be received and accepted.—Carried.

Moved by Captain Weekes, seconded by Captain Sifton, that this Association Meeting do now adjourn during pleasure, and that a meeting of Guides' Officers be now held to discuss regimental matters.—Carried.

The Officer Administering the Corps took the chair.

It was moved by Major Mitchell, seconded by Major De Kam, that in accordance with the proceedings of the last Annual Meeting (February 28th, 1913), with reference to the desirability of organizing a Corps of Guides' Mess, we now proceed to do this, and that the Officer Administering the Corps be requested to arrange the necessary details; and further, that when the Mess is formed, each officer of the Corps be sent a copy of the selected papers of 1914, read before the Corps of Guides' Association, and that a subscription of \$3.00 per year be levied on each officer of the Corps, to constitute a Mess Fund for the purpose of carrying on the publication of papers and other business.—Carried.

Discussion arose as to who should be held responsible for the collection of the subscriptions, and the Officers commanding detachments were directed to collect and transmit the same to the Treasurer.

It was further decided that the disposition of mess funds be left in the hands of the Mess Committee to be used for printing and incidental expenses, and that none of it be used in connection with mess dinners.

This latter clause was moved by Lieut. Howland, seconded by Captain Sifton and carried.

A Mess Committee was formed as follows:—

PRESIDENT—The Officer Administering the Corps.

MEMBERS—Major Chambers and Captain Sifton.

SECRETARY—Captain Sitwell, A.D.M.I.

It was moved by Lieut.-Colonel Van Nostrand, seconded by Major De Kam, that the mess meeting be held during the annual meeting.—Carried

Meeting of Guides' Officers adjourned and the Association meeting resumed at 12.31 p.m.

Major Browne moved, seconded by Captain Gillies that a sum of \$46.25 be paid out of the Association Fund to wipe off the deficit on the Dinner Fund.—Carried.

Major Mitchell moved, seconded by Captain Weekes, that the Secretary be instructed to write to Major Leonard expressing the appreciation of the Association for his kindness in donating a gig to each Detachment.—Carried.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS.

Moved by Captain Sifton, seconded by Captain Tyrrell, that the Officers of the Association for 1914 be the same as those for the past year.—Carried.

The following were therefore declared duly elected to office:—

HON. PRESIDENT—Lt.-Gen. Sir P. H. N. Lake, K.C.M.G.,
C.B.

PRESIDENT—Major General Sir William D. Otter, K.C.B.,
C.V.O.

VICE-PRESIDENT—The Officer Administering the Corps.

MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE—Asst. Director of Military Intelligence and Officers Commanding Detachments.
 SECRETARY—Captain L. H. Sitwell, Asst. Director of Military Intelligence.
 TREASURER—Major J. E. Browne.

The following short summary of the progress of the Corps during the year was read by the Officer Administering:—

1912. PROGRESS DURING YEAR 1913.

21.....	20	Officers joined the Corps.
10.....	13	Officers retired.
5.....	6	Officers went to Corps Reserve.
*1.....	3	Officers went to Reserve of Officers.
7.....	2	Officers obtained Cavalry F. O. Certificates.
	1	Officer obtained Infantry F. O. Certificate.
2.....	3	Officers obtained Cav. Captain's Certificates.
1.....	1	Officer obtained Infantry Captain's Certificate.
5.....	8	Officers obtained Cav. Lieuts. Certificates.
4.....	7	Officers obtained Equitation Certificates.
**2.....	1	Officer obtained Signalling "A" Certificate.
9.....	8	Officers confirmed in rank.
	6	Officers promoted to Major.
2.....	2	Officers promoted to Lieut.-Colonel.
5.....	6	Officers promoted to Captain.
	1	Officer Seconded.
5.....	1	Officer passed M.S.C.
	1	Officer Deceased.
13.....	10	Officers passed Appendix IX, K.R. & O., Sub-head "A."
7.....	8	Officers passed Appendix IX, K.R. & O., Sub-head "B."
71....	52	48 Officers, 170 R. & F. & 181 horses attended Camp.
54..		2 Officers performed special work in lieu of training.
		2 Officers took F. O. Cav. Courses in lieu of training.
86.....	85	Total strength of Officers on Active List.

*Transferred. **Infantry Lieut. Certificate.

The principal changes introduced in 1913 were: -The Tables of Equipment for the Corps, M.O. 142; and the Revision of the Corps Regulations, G. O. 55 of 1913.

Attention of Officers Commanding Detachments is called to the urgent necessity of sending in their requisitions to the P. O. O. Division or District, for arms, shelter tents, and such clothing as is necessary, as early as possible after instructions are issued from Headquarters for enlistment and training.

The meeting adjourned for lunch at 12.45 p.m.

The meeting resumed labour at 2.40 p.m. The chairman read a notice regarding the arrangements made by the Railway Passenger Association about return tickets, and intimated the hour and place, when and where, the Railway representative would be in attendance.

Major Gordon Hall, Officer Commanding the Corps of Guides, lectured on "Intelligence in Peace and War."

It was pointed out that in the past, Officers had but slight ideas of the work which they undertook, and that the lack of uniformity and system of the methods of collecting, distributing, and utilizing the information acquired, entailed a loss of valuable time on the part of those who had to sift and classify the essential points.

It was his intention in the future to eliminate much of the work of both the officers who were collecting intelligence, and on those who publish and were responsible for its issue, and to that end he had prepared certain forms which would in future be used when making reports, and of which samples would be distributed to all concerned. (Several sample forms were given out to those present, so that they could follow the line of argument taken by the speaker).

Discussion on all points was invited and taken advantage of by those present.

The following is a table of the headings touched upon:--

COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE IN PEACE AND WAR.

1. Necessity for preparation in peace.

Japanese system of intelligence.

Peace Intelligence.

- (1) Must be unobtrusive.
- (2) Source from which obtained.
- (3) Must be continuous to be efficacious.
- (4) Smooth transition from peace to war.

War Intelligence, need for training for.

What is war intelligence?

What has been so far accomplished as regards Canada.

2. How are Intelligence Officers to get practice?

Limitations of manoeuvres for such work.

How Intelligence Exercises afford practice.

General scope of such an exercise.

Objects of the exercise.

TASK 1.—Decisive steps to organize Intelligence Service in Districts.

- I. External and internal intelligence.
- II. The kind of information required.
- III. Means to be employed.

3. Methodical recording of Intelligence.

Conciseness and clearness of arrangement of reports.

Study of Military Reports, &c.

Result of not keeping reports up to date.

Importance of Intelligence re internal security.

Co-operation with police.

Protective Intelligence.

TASK 2.—Use of forms for Summary of Intelligence.

4. Use of graphics.

TASK 3.

5. Use of ciphers owing to wireless.

TASK 4.—Playfair cipher.

Psychology for Intelligence Officers.

At the conclusion, the chairman tendered the thanks of the officers present to Major Gordon Hall for his interesting and instructive remarks, and hoped that the lessons learned would be remembered and acted upon, not only by the Officers Commanding Detachments and Divisional and District Intelligence Officers, to whom they were more particularly directed, but also to every officer who was present.

At 4.50 p.m., the Honourable the Minister of Militia and Defence, visited the meeting and addressed the officers briefly. He congratulated the Association upon the attendance of members, and was gratified to know that practically all parts of the Dominion were represented.

Before leaving to attend another meeting, each officer was presented to him and he informed the Secretary that, in spite of having three dinners to attend that evening, he would dine with the Officers of the Guides, and trusted that he would be allowed to leave early, in order to attend to other duties.

The meeting closed for the day at 5.10 p.m.

The Eighth Annual Dinner was held in the "New Russell" Green Room at 8.15 p.m.

The following officers and guests were present:—

OFFICERS—Lieut.-Colonels Van Nostrand, Richardson and Hesketh; Majors Chambers, Browne, Mersereau, O'Hara, Stead, Mitchell and DeKam; Captains Sifton, Gillies, Goodwin, Tyrrell, Ross, Biggs, Weekes; Lieutenants Howland and Dansereau.

EX-OFFICERS—Majors Tremaine, Hamilton and Caldwell; Capt. L. Sherwood.

GUESTS—The Hon. S. Hughes, Minister of Militia; Col. W. G. Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff; Major-Gen'l. Sir W. D. Otter, K.C.B., C.V.O., Hon. Colonel, Corps of Guides; Major Gordon Hall, D.M.O.; Major Kemmis-Betty, D.M.T.; Captain L. H. Sitwell, A.D.M.I.; Commander P. Howe, R.N.; Lt.-Col. Hill, 44th Regt.; Lt.-Col. R. W. Lang, C.E.; Lt.-Col. Smith, 5th P.L.D.G.; Major Wynne, C.O.C.; Major Ducharme, C.F.A.; Mr. Secord and Mr. Beale.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 27TH, 1914.

Business was resumed at 10.25 a.m.

Major C. H. Mitchell gave an address upon the Balkan War, and illustrated his remarks by lantern slides.

After reviewing the causes and the political conditions surrounding the formation of the Balkan League, the strategical considerations were presented. The geographical and topographical features were explained, and the points of concentration and the lines of advance as adopted on both sides were shown by maps. The methods utilized by the Allies to prevent leak of information and to deceive and mislead the Turkish Commanders were described.

Slides showing the positions occupied by the various Army Corps during the general advance, extending over a considerable period of time, were shown in succession, and the strategical and tactical considerations influencing the movements, clearly explained in detail.

It was shown how, owing to the nature of the country, intercommunication between the various Army Corps of the Bulgarians was maintained, and in one instance, lost, whereby the 1st Army Corps made a mistake in advancing too quickly and actually carried out the intentions of the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, whilst its position should have been miles in rear as the Reserve Army, ready to move to either west or east to reinforce the 2nd or 3rd Army Corps as occasion required.

The fog of war to the South of the Bulgarian Boundary was drawn attention to, and it was pointed out that during the first stages of the war, the Turks were supposed to have a large army to the south east of Adrianople, whereas they had very few in that locality, their concentration points being Kirk Killissa and Lule Burgas.

Further fog was caused by the fact that in the previous year the Turkish Army had undertaken a series of Army manoeuvres between Adrianople, Demotika and Tchorlu, and it was taken advantage of by the Bulgarians, that being familiar with the ground the Turks would naturally concentrate there, and would expect attack by the Bulgarians in actuality the same as in manoeuvre.

The original Turkish scheme included an army of invasion by sea to Burgas so as to cut into the rear of the 3rd Army Corps north of Adrianople and the frontier.

The various opening engagements commencing October 22nd, 1912, were touched upon and the results, from the unexpected success of the Bulgarians in capturing Kirk Kilisse so early in the war, were explained. This success on the Bulgarians left flank was not followed up with alacrity and much valuable time lost, which with further delays in the campaign cost the Bulgarians dear.

The five days battle of Lule Burgas was described in detail, and the prolonging of the Bulgarians lines of attack to twice their intended front in the first two days' fighting involved them in dangerous tactical situations which, however, the Turks were unable to properly take advantage of owing to their poor communications and lack of supplies. The Bulgarian Cavalry failed to pursue after this battle, and much time and valuable opportunities for completing the operation were thus lost.

The route of the Turks and their disorganized retreat from Lule Burgas to the lines of Tchataldja in front of Constantinople were also described, as well as the various futile attacks upon the latter position so strongly held by the Turks, and the final outbreak of cholera resulting in the armistice at the end of November.

The subsequent siege operations at Adrianople covering the period up to the final assault and capture of the fortress by the allied Bulgarians and Servians during the last week of March, 1913, were also described, the tactical conditions under which the assault was delivered being of special interest.

The operations in the other theatres of the war, especially those of the Servians culminating in the sanguinary battle of Kumanova in October, 1912, were touched upon. The lecturer also explained the secondary war in July, 1913, between the allies themselves, the Bulgarians and the Greeks, north of Salonika, and the heavy fighting which resulted in the rapid retreat of the Bulgarians across their own frontier.

Finally a slide was shown illustrating the final partition of the various countries as resulting from the two wars and

the simultaneous quarrel between Bulgaria and Roumania, whereby Turkey lost 85% of her European Area; Bulgaria, while doing most of the fighting, gained only 16% of her former area, Servia 80%, and Greece, while doing the least fighting, got 87% of which a great part is coastline including the valuable sea port of Salonica. Adrianople, after all, still remains Turkish.

The main lessons, as pointed out from the war, were regarding difficulties of communication; the conservation of the cavalry for decisive action; the universal use of the bayonet; the use of hasty entrenchments, the manner of employment of which by the Bulgarians was to be commended, whilst on the Turkish side the siting was poor. The greatest lesson always to be considered under modern conditions, was the advantage of preparation and readiness to take the field with a thoroughly sound and well matured plan of campaign—the Turks did not have such, the Bulgarians did.

Major-General Sir William Otter addressed the Officers, and on behalf of those present, thanked the lecturer for his excellent paper.

The interest he felt in the subject was of personal interest to him, as some years ago, when travelling in Europe, he had visited a portion of the country referred to. The lecturer deserved great credit for the trouble he had taken in preparing his paper, which showed careful study and deep reading, and he had great pleasure in tendering the thanks of the Officers to Major Mitchell, for the instructive historical outline of our most modern war.

At 12 noon, Lieut.-Colonel E. D. Farquhar, D.S.O., Coldstream Guards, Military Secretary to H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught, addressed the Officers on "Intelligence."

He briefly reviewed the subject from peace and war conditions, with illustrations from history and personal reminiscences, and strongly advised all Officers to study "Henderson" and any other text books they could get hold of. An Intelligence officer's duty is never done; in private life he should train his senses so that in war things would come more naturally without such effort as would otherwise obtain.

Discussion was invited, and Majors Chambers, Mercereau, Mitchell and De Kam, also Lieut.-Colonel Richardson, asked questions.

Colonel Gwatkin, C.G.S., and Major Gordon Hall, D.M.O., also spoke.

Captain Weekes, on behalf of those present, tendered a vote of thanks to the lecturer for his kindness in addressing the meeting.

The meeting adjourned for lunch at 1.20 p.m., Major Chambers entertaining the visiting officers in the Senate.

Business was resumed at 3.05 p.m. for general business.

The Secretary having received a telegram from Lieut.-Colonel Burns, to the effect that Major I. R. Read, of the 17th D.Y.R.C.H., had died suddenly during the morning, and also attention being drawn by the Secretary to the fact that the deceased officer was a member of the Guides' Association, Captain Sifton moved, seconded by Major O'Hara, that the Secretary be instructed to send a telegram on behalf of the officers of the Guides' Association assembled, to Lieut.-Colonel Burns, asking him to convey the condolence and sympathy of the meeting to the relatives of the late member. Carried. (Telegram sent 5.10 p.m.)

Under the heading of business arising out of the minutes of last meeting, the Secretary was asked what action had been taken in respect to the proposed change in Mess uniform.

Moved by Captain Sifton, seconded by Captain Weekes, that the Association adjourn during pleasure, and that a meeting of Guides' Officers be temporarily held to discuss the matter.—Carried.

The Secretary stated that up to date no official action had been taken, and no official report upon the subject received by the Department, as required by the motion last year. Major Mitchell moved, seconded by Captain Weekes, that whereas there has been no official action taken during the past year to change the Mess uniform, it is the opinion of those present that the Mess uniform be retained as it is.—Carried unanimously.

OFFICERS VOTING The Honorary Colonel; Lieut.-Cols. Van Nostrand, Richardson, and Hesketh; Majors De Kam, O'Hara, Browne and Mitchell; Captains Gillies, Biggs, Weekes, Sifton, Ross; Lieutenants Greening and Howland.

A discussion arose upon the question of full dress uniform for the rank and file. Several officers expressed their views, and it was understood that the Department of Militia had already refused to grant it, but Major Mitchell moved, seconded by Captain Sifton, that whereas it is desirable and necessary that a full dress uniform be supplied for the non-commissioned officers and guides in the mounted companies, the Officer Administering the Corps be requested to bring this resolution before the proper authorities. Carried unanimously.

Lieut.-Colonel Richardson moved, seconded by Captain Goodwin, that this Guides' Officers' Meeting adjourn, and that the Association meeting open.—Carried.

As representations have been made from officers in the West, to hold the next Annual Meeting in Winnipeg, as being more centrally located and to give the officers in Military Districts No. 11 and 13 a chance to meet officers from the East, the matter was opened for discussion.

Major Mitchell moved, seconded by Lieut. Howland, it is in the opinion of this Association, that it is desirable to hold the next meeting in Winnipeg, and that the Honourable the Minister be asked for a grant of \$600.00 in order to help to defray the railway expenses of one delegate from each detachment and the officials of the Association, who must necessarily be present.—Carried unanimously.

OFFICERS' VOTING Lieut.-Colonels Van Nostrand, Richardson, and Hesketh; Majors De Kam, O'Hara, Browne, and Mitchell; Captains Goodwin, Stead, Gillies, Biggs, Weekes, Sifton, and Ross; Lieutenants Greening and Howland.

Moved by Lieutenant Howland, seconded by Captain Biggs, that the following Committee, consisting of Major Leonard, Major Chambers and Captain Sifton, interview the Honourable the Minister upon the former subject. If they succeed in obtaining a grant, the meeting to be held in Winnipeg, if not, the meeting to be held in Ottawa as heretofore; the Secretary to notify members, well in advance, of place of meeting.—Carried.

Major Browne moved, seconded by Captain Biggs, that the amount of \$300.00 presented by Lieut. Johnston, be set aside in a separate account in the bank, and that the financial statement be printed in the annual report. Carried.

Captain Biggs moved, seconded by Captain Weekes, that the thanks of the visiting officers be tendered to the Executive Committee for the excellent arrangements they had made to ensure the success of the meeting, and for their services during the past year.—Carried.

The motion was conveyed by the Chairman.

Moved by Major De Kam, seconded by Lieut. Howland, that this Annual Meeting be now adjourned. Carried.

The Meeting formally closed at 4.50 p.m.

**STATEMENT OF CORPS OF GUIDES' ASSOCIATION
AND DINNER ACCOUNTS, 1913-1914.**

Association Funds.

RECEIPTS.		EXPENDITURE.	
Bal. Cr. brought forward. . .	\$147 25	Printing programmes of meeting	\$ 3 00
Bal. Cr. from Xmas Card Fund	5 50	Gratuities to porters, &c	2 00
Lieut. Johnston's subscrip- tion	300 00	Expenses, H. Qrs. Com- mittee, per Capt. Sitwell	7 70
Annual subscriptions	44 00	R. J. Taylor's acct., print- ing lectures, 1913 meet- ing	72 00
		Incidentals, postage and commission on cheques	1 00
			<hr/>
			\$ 85 70
		Balance Cr	411 05
			<hr/>
	\$196 75		\$196 75

Dinner Fund.

RECEIPTS.		EXPENDITURE.	
35 subscriptions at \$4 each . .	\$140 00	Balance Dr. from 1912 . .	\$ 19 45
		Printing Menus	3 00
		Gratuities to waiters	6 00
		Russell House acct.	157 20
Balance Dr.	46 25	Commission, etc	60
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	\$186 25		\$186 25

Summary.

	Dr.	Cr.
Association Fund }		\$411 05
Old Xmas Card Fund }		
Dinner Fund	46 25	
Balance Cr.	364 80	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$411 05	\$411 05

INTELLIGENCE LECTURE.

BY

LIEUT.-COL. E. D. FARQUHAR, D.S.O.

(Military Secretary to H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught.)

GENTLEMEN:

I should like to begin by expressing to you how very much flattered I feel by being asked to say something to you on Intelligence Duties. It is a great pleasure to me to do so, but I cannot help being rather doubtful as to whether I am the right man for the job, as although I have specialized in Intelligence work, all my experience has been in the British Isles and Western Europe. The value of practical experience seems to me to lie in being able to collect a large number of small points, which have been practically tested; none of them may be important in themselves, but as a whole they form a valuable *vade-mecum* for an Intelligence Officer.

Now conditions in Europe, with its innumerable roads and railways, its small enclosures, its close population and its comparatively short distances, is very different to the conditions obtaining in the Dominion.

I have consequently omitted many points which did not seem to me to apply to Canada, but I must warn you that this process may not have been sufficiently drastic.

First of all as to Intelligence duties in general.

You probably know Bernard Shaw's description of a soldier - "A man who is always preparing for something that never happens and which when it does happen is quite different to what everyone expected."

I fear that there is a substratum of truth in this. The gunner and the rifleman find it very difficult to reproduce war conditions with blank cartridges. This is not the case with the Intelligence Officer. Given that the probable theatre of war is known, an enormous amount of valuable information may be acquired in peace time. The extent of this information and its accuracy will be of the first importance as regards the marching of troops, their food supply and water arrangements, and consequently the maintenance of that high morale

which is the motive power of the fighting man. The omission of some small apparently unimportant detail in a report may mean 20 or 30 rifles less in the firing line, as these omissions multiply the reduction in fighting men increases and becomes a most important factor. I should like to impress on you the absolute reality of Intelligence work and the necessity for the personal checking of every piece of information. Another very important point to remember is that information is of no use unless it is properly distributed.

The following instance shows what I mean. Some 5 or 6 years ago in England, the General who was going to command one side on the manoeuvres determined to have a reconnaissance made of the probable theatre of operations. Three officers were sent down to do this, myself among the number. The country consisted of long lines of high parallel ridges with narrow valleys in between. So long as operations were conducted down the valleys the question of transport was easy. As events turned out, the advance of the two armies was across those lines of ridges, and the problem of how to get the transport in and out of the valleys along the rather indifferent roads, became an important one. There was one particular village called Broadehalk, the streets of which were narrow and twisted, which was unfortunate as the village constituted an important road junction. There was a fairly good road into it from the high ridge to the South, but the exit by another steep ridge to the North was impassable by transport and was reported to be so in the preliminary reconnaissance. This fact was not communicated to the transport officer concerned, and the consequence was that the transport came down the road from the South and vainly endeavoured to get out to the North. To add to the confusion a Howitzer Brigade came along the valley road from the West and butted into the line of transport. The streets were too narrow for the wagons to be turned round conveniently, and the net result was the complete blocking of vehicles in this village for the whole night. The men got no food and operations the next day were seriously interfered with. This incident was quite avoidable, as full information as to the road conditions in this village had actually been reported to the Headquarters Staff in detail. This sounds incredible, but as a matter of fact, in the stress and rush of manoeuvre operations, such incidents are very liable to occur.

Again, if at the outbreak of war, information is distributed to troops giving every detail of the prospective theatre of war, the result will be a feeling of confidence in Generals and Staffs that may be invaluable.

PEACE RECONNAISSANCE.

I had the honour of writing three or four pages of the latest edition of the F. S. Pocket Book on Reconnaissance, pages 64-68, to which I may refer you for certain details for which we have no time here. Three things strike me about the average Reconnaissance report:—

1. The amount of unnecessary information sent in, out of which the good stuff has to be laboriously dug.
2. The want of even a measure of uniformity in the form of the report.
3. The verbose style of many reports.

Experience is the great thing: an officer's second report is usually half the size and twice the value of his first attempt.

The first step towards a satisfactory report is for the reconnoitering officer to be given a clear and definite idea of what is required, with possibly a sample report to guide him. For instance, some officers would consider that a billeting reconnaissance should include elaborate details of railways, bridges and tactical considerations, all of which do affect billeting to some degree. Personally, I think if one attempts too much one accomplishes comparatively little, and it is better to confine oneself to the job in hand, the extraneous points being treated generally.

As regards the form, the most satisfactory method is to divide the report into two parts. The first part should be "form at a glance": that is to say, the salient points should be given which can be seen rapidly. Part II should contain the details in tabular form.

There are disadvantages as well as advantages to using a fixed form, but I think the latter outweighs the former. If the same form is always used, one knows in a minute where to look for certain items of information; in addition the form acts as a refresher to the memory, and if reports are eventually to be bound together, the fact that they are similar in form,

relieves the editor of much unnecessary work. Photographs, postcards, should be relegated to an appendix.

MAPS.

Now we come to a somewhat debatable question—that of maps.

Every report must, of course, be accompanied by a map, the question is should the reconnaissance officer draw it.

I remember quite well that when I joined and for some years later, we always were made to draw a map when doing a reconnaissance. As we had but little practice at map-making, and as the maps were more closely examined than the report, we used to spend three-quarters of the time on the technical work of the map and only one-quarter on the written report.

At any rate, in England and Western Europe, this seems to me to be radically unsound. Excellent maps exist of all countries there, usually at three or four different scales. What is the use of spending three-quarters of one's time making an indifferent copy of the existing ordnance map? Personally, I must have done several hundred miles of road reconnaissance and I invariably used existing ordnance maps, possibly adding rough sketches to show difficult exits from the villages and similar points.

In peace time in well mapped countries, I should invariably make every use of existing maps. If the scales are unsuitable, make an enlargement or reduction before starting, and fill in the details.

The great point to remember is that the object of a reconnaissance is to obtain information that is not apparent from the map, such as the actual measurements of roads, the width and construction of bridges, the carrying powers of ferries, the nature of woods and of fences and enclosures, the visibility of certain points, range of fire and vision, etc., etc.

In badly mapped countries, some other course may have to be adopted, or again maps may be made for purposes of instruction: on service too, maps may be scarce and it may not be possible to cut one up to attach to the report. In any

case, however, remember that it is the report that is the important part of the reconnaissance, not the map.

INDEFINITENESS OF INFORMATION.

Another important thing to remember is to give definite information. For instance, it is certainly desirable to know that animals can be watered in a certain stream, but it is just as important to know how many can be watered simultaneously, how much R. E. work is required, etc.

Again, when dealing with tactical questions, it is useful to know that a certain ridge forms a good defensive position, but this could be deduced from the map. What cannot be deduced from the map is the appropriate garrison, position for reserves and artillery, etc.

ROADS.

In Europe, roads are usually divided into three classes.

1. Roads admitting of two streams of traffic, an up and a down line, 19 feet of metalling or more.
2. Metalled roads narrower than the above.
3. Farm tracks.

The question of the surface of the road should be noted, but need not interfere with the classification, as a first class road which has a bad surface in November may be remetalled the following January, and will then have an excellent surface. Probably these methods are hardly applicable to Canada.

Gradients should only be mentioned when they affect the rate of marching. In these cases the actual gradient should be given.

BRIDGES. —The details of important bridges should be given, in particular their power of carrying M. T.

TOWNS. The population, position of P. T. O., method of lighting, the way through the town, mentioning streets, should always be given, as well as the principle industries.

OBSERVATION POINTS.—Any points from whence a good view can be obtained should be mentioned, with the actual range of vision therefrom. This may be of great help to Generals and their Staff, particularly in flat country.

SUPPLIES.—(Two Chief Points).

1. Organization of supplies in district. Where the distributing centres lie, what is the method of distribution, amount of stock usually kept in villages, etc.

2. Items of information likely to prove of interest, such as the actual or possible output of bakeries, flour mills, etc., names of prominent forage and meat contractors (and their reputation), average amount of petrol to be had, amount of forage kept on farms, prices, variations according to time of year, etc.

A very great amount of statistical information is usually available from official returns and publications.

RIVERS.

A river can affect an army in many different ways. It may be merely a barrier, it may be a defensive position, or merely a delaying position, it may cover a flank, it may be an auxiliary line of supply.

The nature of Part I of the River Report will vary according to the function of the river. Part II will contain every detail of the crossings over the river, (bridges, ferry, ford, etc.) It is important to lay particular emphasis on the approaches to both banks and to look out for suitable places to throw pontoons.

BILLETING.

The system of billeting is a great feature in foreign armies. After attending several foreign manoeuvres, I am rather of the opinion that the worst billet is usually better than the best bivouac.

In delightful summer weather, a bivouac is excellent, but if it is cold or wet or windy, one is often so cold that one cannot really rest, however tired one may be, and one starts the next day at a great handicap, compared to the man who has been between four walls.

In Europe the Mayor of each commune possesses a billeting census, which is revised annually. The system works A. 1. and when one sees a French or German battalion going into billets, it is like a number of workmen returning home after a day's work, no difficulties and few delays.

We know less about it in England: but I am convinced that the way to make a billeting reconnaissance is to roughly classify villages in three or four groups, such as:—

- (a) Best class of agricultural village.
- (b) Agricultural village—space restricted.
- (c) Residential town—wide streets.
- (d) Industrial Town—poor type of house.

Then ascertain the population of the village and allot billets at the rate of approximately 10, 8, 4, or one soldier per inhabitant respectively.

This rough and ready method is far quicker and more satisfactory than trying to measure houses, and then allotting men at the rate of one or two per yard, according to the depth of the street. Such a method would take years to compile, although it is useful enough when dealing with single buildings like a barn.

The question of accommodation for guns and vehicles must not be overlooked, although there should be less difficulty in Canada with its wide open spaces than there would be "on the other side." Still it is poor fun pulling vehicles out of ploughed fields, so that consideration must be borne in mind.

The most usual omissions are details as regards water supply and neglect to mention any large buildings such as schools or country houses, in which a considerable number of men could be accommodated.

The reconnaissance of docks and railways should usually be left to experts and hardly come within the scope of this lecture.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

1. It is essential to know the exact length of one's stride and one's foot, the span of one's hand, which joint of one's finger is exactly one inch long, etc.

2. It is also advisable to train one's memory to remember figures and notes until one has an opportunity of putting them on paper. In this connection it is good practice to train oneself to keep the features of the country in one's head without continually consulting a map. This is good training for night

work when a map cannot be seen. They train officers to do this in the French Army with considerable success. In fact, General Treméau, the late French Generalissimo, was said to be so well acquainted with the features of the Franco-German frontier that he could run a staff ride in that region without looking at the map.

INTELLIGENCE AT MANOEUVRES.

I should now like to say a few words about Intelligence work at Manoeuvres. A preliminary reconnaissance of the country is a useful exercise on these occasions.

During actual manoeuvres events succeed each other so quickly—so much more quickly than would be the case on service—that, although information is easy enough to get, it is extremely difficult to send it back to one's commander in time to be of any use.

If you will forgive my mentioning some personal experiences, I can give you an instance of the difficulty of getting back information. It is of course quite easy to penetrate the enemy's out-posts under cover of darkness, and it may be possible to locate certain of the enemy's forces, and to get back again before day has broken. If, however, one is still in the enemy's lines when it has become light, the problem of getting one's information back is not an easy one. Some years ago, being an Intelligence Officer on manoeuvres, I hired a carrier's cart, filled it with sacks, hid myself under the sacks, and having fortunately hit off the right road, I was enabled to locate almost all of the enemy's Brigades. The hostile cavalry looked into the cart, but their search was fortunately rather perfunctory. This was all very well, but by the time my cart had got down the length of the enemy's line and out again, it was nearly 4 p.m., so that the information was already stale by the time it was brought back to my General. The next year, having a similar duty to perform, I thought it would be an interesting plan to make use of carrier pigeons. Now pigeons must be familiar with the locality over which they fly, otherwise they go round and round in ever widening circles, and may take a long time to get home. It is also advisable to remember that they should not be fed

immediately before they are let loose. A rather amusing incident occurred on this occasion to point this moral. A cavalry subaltern and two men were sent out to get through the enemy's outposts, and with the aid of four pigeons to send back his dispositions at dawn. Thomas Atkins, as you know, is the most kind-hearted of men, and in spite of all orders, these pigeons were stuffed with corn during the greater part of the night. The subaltern did his work very well, located the enemy's forces, and about dawn was held up by some of the hostile cavalry. He, however, had his report already written and attached to the pigeon, so he felt quite happy. Unfortunately, when the psychological moment arrived to let the pigeon loose, it was so bursting with food that instead of flying home like an arrow from the bow, it with great difficulty fluttered up into the lowest branch of the nearest tree, from which no persuasion nor any number of stones could dislodge it. That particular message took 24 hours to reach home. As far as I remember, the other pigeons were pretty satisfactory, the messages averaging about two hours from the time they were sent to the time they were delivered to the General. The system on these occasions is for the pigeon to fly home; as it enters the pigeon loft it causes a bell to ring. The owner then takes the message and telegraphs it to some pre-arranged point, or else gives it to a motor-cycle orderly who takes it direct to Headquarters. These devices are very good fun, and I think they afford a considerable amount of instruction in making an Intelligence officer polish up his ingenuity, but one must be careful to keep one's efforts within reasonable bounds and not to do things which would be entirely impossible in war.

One young officer made a considerable name for himself during two successive manoeuvres in England some years ago. On one occasion he cut a hole in the tent of a well-known General and stole his despatch box. The General was of a somewhat irascible temperament and the loss of his orders and notes really affected him considerably and may have had quite an appreciable effect on the next day's operations.

On another occasion this young officer desired to obtain a trophy from the enemy. He located one of the enemy's camps and hid himself with some cyclist scouts in a wood near-by. He then got hold of one of those itinerant vendors of drinks that one sees at English Manoeuvres and took him into his

confidence. At the pre-arranged moment the vendor of drinks went up to the guard tent and said: "Now boys, I have had such a good day I will give the guard drinks for nothing." It was a very hot day and the guard rushed out to take advantage of this generous offer. When the guard tent was empty the officer cut a hole in the back of the tent, and with the assistance of a corporal, he stole the battalion machine gun. He got this back to his cyclist party who had contrived a cradle between two of their bicycles and they successfully got off with the spoil.

The knowledge that a piratical gentleman of this description is on the other side, makes all guards, outposts, etc., particularly on the alert and for this reason, I think, work of that sort is advisable on manoeuvres, provided, of course, it is kept within due bounds.

As regards reconnaissance in war, I cannot do better than to refer you to a book called "The Art of Reconnaissance," by General David Henderson, than whom there is no greater authority.

WAR.

I have not the time to enter into a long description of Intelligence duties in war time, but have jotted down certain points that seem worthy of consideration.

1. The Press.

The question of the control of the Press in war is a very thorny one. It appears to me that the best solution of the numerous difficulties is to draw up regulations in peace with the aid of both soldiers and the press authorities. Not the least important point is that the special correspondents frequently give away information unwittingly. The most famous example of this is the telegram to an English newspaper, in 1870, which disclosed to Von Moltke the direction of MacMahon's march towards Metz and which resulted in the battle of Sedan.

2. It is for the Intelligence Officer to sum up the information he has got and to say to his General: "The disposition of the enemy is as follows, with a possibility of other bodies of troops being in such and such positions." It is not for the General to judge of the accuracy of the information; that

is the work of the Intelligence Officer. The enemy's dispositions are usually done by means of a map.

3. As regards the position of the Intelligence Officer. With large bodies, a division or army, he will be at his General's Headquarters. With smaller bodies, it is permissible for him to leave his General and to do reconnaissance himself, provided there is some representative at Headquarters to deal with Intelligence matters.

4. An Intelligence Officer should be trained to observe from an aeroplane. This is by no means an easy business and requires, I am told, almost as much practice as learning to pilot the machine.

5. When collecting information, it is useful to divide it into three classes:—

- (1) What you regard as true.
- (2) What you regard as probable but insufficiently confirmed.
- (3) Doubtful information.

Gentlemen, I trust you will forgive the discursive nature of the remarks I have made to you. Intelligence is so large a subject, that it is impossible to deal with its various developments in a single lecture. I consequently have had to jump from point to point, taking up those which I thought would be of most interest to you.